One law for all? The logic of cultural accommodation
One Law for All? The Logic of Cultural Accommodation^
I.
At the same time, we live in a society in which there are many different cultures and a bewildering variety of religions and belief systems, each capable of attributing peculiar significance to the actions and circumstances in which the law of the land is interested. Two pieces of behavior that look like the same action may have different meanings for those who perform them. Two sets of circumstances that seem identical from the point of view of one culture may look quite different when described in the language of another. So how do we know when the law is the same for everyone? Is it enough that it treats the same behavior in the same physical circumstances identically; or does the rule of law only require that we treat identically pieces of behavior that have the same significance for those who perform them and, perhaps also, for those on whom they are performed?
For example, some children get together with an older adult, and he supplies them with alcohol. A priest passes a cup of wine to young communicants. Are these the same action or different actions? A man is found in a public place with a knife concealed on his person. Is this knife a dangerous and offensive weapon? Or does it belong to a Sikh, carrying a kirpan, in fulfillment of religious obligation?
the judge found he had no alternative but to give Arthur (as I suppose we should call him) the benefit of Section 1395)(b) ofthe Criminal Justice Act of 1988, which provides the following statutory defense to a charge of carrying in a public place "any article which has a blade or is sharply pointed":
it shall be a defense for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had the article with him (a) for use at work; (b) for religious reasons; or (c) as part of any national costume.
The parliamentary record is pretty clear that this defense was enacted for the benefit of members of the Sikh community, not for the likes of Arthur Uther Pendragon.6 But of course that is just the sort of thing for which one must not use legislative intention; one must not use it to turn a very general exception into one that is focused on the benefit to a particular person or group. One must follow the general terms of the defense wherever they lead, or else one has given up on even this modified version of the rule of law. So in this case, the very terms of the exception laid down in the statute led the judge to dismiss the charges and order the police to give King Arthur back his Excalibur.
II.
It is natural to think of the exemption for the use of communion wine during prohibition7 - a harmless use (at best a sip and certainly not intoxicating) - as our model for religious and cultural exemptions. We exempt the conduct because we can see that it is not really the sort of thing at which the general prohibition is aimed.
other." Now, a number of witnesses, all (like Kargar) recent emigrants from Afghanistan, testified that kissing an infant son's penis is common in Afghanistan, that it is done to show love for the child, that it is acceptable up until at least the third year of the child's life, and that there are no sexual feelings involved. (Indeed, if there were sexual feelings, the same culture - Islam as practiced in Afghanistan - would punish the father's action with death.)9
other words, the Maine provision mentions body parts and specifies contact between them as the offense, and everyone, no matter what the significance of contact with those body parts is to them, is held to that norm. Now, is this what we mean by legal equality, the rule of law, one law for all?
Such an account would be plausible if the best understanding of the law (and the law's policy in this regard) had to do with body parts and physical behavior. But in fact the policy behind the statute is in large part itself cultural: it is oriented to the particular meaning - the intense sexual meaning of mouth-genital contact in contemporary American culture. Because the law is oriented toward cultural meaning in that way, it surely should be open to the possibility that the same behavior (with the same body parts) might have a quite different cultural meaning to those who only just now are becoming acquainted with America's sexual obsessions. In this case, an intelligent application of the rule-of-law ideal seems to militate against the idea of a single rule applying to everyone; it seems to argue instead for the uniform application of a standard that condemns the relevant contact on account of its sexual meaning rather than its purely behavioral characteristics.
III.
The Kargar and communion-wine cases provide examples of the need to think carefully about the application of this idea of one law for all. But that paradigm does not work for every case.
content of the obligation is in fact at odds with the intent behind the general prohibition in the statute. The general prohibition aims at a situation in which people do not present themselves to one another in public as armed, imposing, martial figures, but the religious obligation of the Sikh initiate is to present himself in exactly that light.